ABSTRACT

Basic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will addresses the issue of whether we can make sense of the widespread conviction that we are morally responsible beings. It focuses on the claim that we deserve to be blamed and punished for our immoral actions, and how this claim can be justified given the philosophical and scientific reasons to believe that we lack the sort of free will required for this sort of desert.

Contributions to the book distinguish between, and explore, two clusters of questions. The first asks what it is to deserve to be harmed or benefitted. What are the bases for desert – actions, good character, bad character, the omission of good character traits? The second cluster explores the disagreement between compatabilists and incompatibilists surrounding the nature of desert. Do we deserve to be harmed, benefitted, or judged, even if we lack the ability to act differently, and if we do not, what effect does this have on our everyday actions?

Taken in full, this book sheds light on the notion of desert implicated in our practice of holding each other morally responsible. This book was originally published as a special issue of Philosophical Explorations.

chapter |4 pages

Introduction

chapter 1|16 pages

Giving desert its due

chapter 1|1 pages

Introduction

chapter 2|3 pages

Luck and the Fairness of Sanctions Thesis

chapter 3|2 pages

Luck and the Desert of Sanctions Thesis

chapter 4|4 pages

Luck and the Reactive Attitudes Thesis

chapter 7|1 pages

Conclusion

chapter |2 pages

Acknowledgements

chapter |2 pages

References

part 3|1 pages

A Strawsonian look at desert

chapter 1|3 pages

Standard conceptual analyses of desert

chapter 2|1 pages

Theories of freedom and responsibility

chapter 3|5 pages

Strawson

chapter |3 pages

Acknowledgements

chapter |2 pages

References

part 4|10 pages

Some theses on desert

chapter |1 pages

Acknowledgements

chapter |1 pages

References

chapter 1|2 pages

Introduction

chapter 2|1 pages

Desert and appraisal

chapter 3|3 pages

Desert and communication

chapter 4|3 pages

Desert and sanction

chapter 5|1 pages

Conclusion

chapter |1 pages

Acknowledgements

chapter |2 pages

References

part 6|1 pages

Blame, desert and compatibilist capacity: a diachronic account of moderateness in regards to reasons-responsiveness Nicole A Vincent

chapter 1|2 pages

Capacitarian thinking and compatibilism

chapter 2|1 pages

A sketch of Fischer’s compatibilism

chapter 3|6 pages

No capacities in a deterministic universe

chapter 4|3 pages

My diachronic sense of capacity

chapter 5|1 pages

Conclusion

chapter |1 pages

Acknowledgements

chapter |2 pages

References

part 7|1 pages

Choosing freedom: basic desert and the standpoint of blame

chapter 1|1 pages

Setting the stage

chapter 2|1 pages

Against realist compatibilism

chapter 4|2 pages

Interpersonal blame: Strawson and Scanlon

chapter 6|1 pages

Conclusion

chapter |1 pages

Notes

chapter |2 pages

References

chapter 1|1 pages

Introduction

chapter 2|4 pages

Basic desert and the morality of blame

chapter 3|2 pages

Vargas’s revisionism

chapter 4|4 pages

The difficulties of conceptual revision

chapter 5|1 pages

Conclusion

chapter |2 pages

Acknowledgements

chapter 1|1 pages

Introduction

chapter 2|1 pages

Manipulation arguments

chapter 3|1 pages

The four-case argument

chapter 4|3 pages

Two views on desert

chapter 5|4 pages

Desert and the four-case argument

chapter 6|1 pages

Resolving the stalemate