ABSTRACT
Phenomenological accounts of sociality in Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Scheler, Schütz, Stein and many others offer powerful lines of arguments to recast current, predominantly analytic, discussions on collective intentionality and social cognition. Against this background, the aim of this volume is to reevaluate, critically and in contemporary terms, the rich phenomenological resources regarding social reality: the interpersonal, collective and communal aspects of the life-world (Lebenswelt). Specifically, the book pursues three interrelated objectives: it aims 1.) to systematically explore the key phenomenological aspects of social reality; 2.) to offer novel, state-of-the-art assessments of both central and lesser-known proponents of the phenomenology of sociality (Gurwitsch, Löwith, von Hildebrand, or Walther), and 3.) to contextualize this elaborate body of work in light of contemporary social cognition research, the growing literature in analytic social ontology, and current trends in moral psychology, moral phenomenology, and social and political philosophy. The collection brings together original articles by a host of prominent scholars and upcoming young talents to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date treatment of the topic. It will be essential reading for those studying phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity, empathy, and community, including analytic, social, moral and political philosophers, and will also be of interest for social scientists and social psychologists.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
part I|64 pages
Historical and Methodological Issues
part II|50 pages
Intersubjectivity, the “We-World,” and Objectivity
chapter 5|14 pages
Concrete Interpersonal Encounters or Sharing a Common World
chapter 6|20 pages
Ineinandersein and L'interlacs
part III|76 pages
Social Cognition, Embodiment, and Social Emotions
chapter 10|14 pages
“If I had to live like you, I think I'd kill myself”
part IV|62 pages
Collective Intentionality and Affectivity
chapter 13|15 pages
Affective Intentionality
part V|48 pages
Collective Agency and Group Personhood