ABSTRACT
First published in 2000. This is Volume II of six in the Library of Philosophy series on the Philosophy of Science. Written in 1938, philosophical systems which employ logical methods almost exclusively would undoubtedly be expected to produce non-empirical results. If, however, logic is taken simply as a method of connecting meanings it is not difficult to reconcile logical methods with empirical results. If logical formular, in other words, assert nothing about the meanings of propositions, but simply show how such meanings are connected, then an empiricism based on a logical analysis of meanings is not inconsistent. This is what the Logical Positivists have attempted to do. This book looks at two areas: the foundations of a scientific method free from metaphysics, and the elimination of pseudo-concepts introduced by metaphysics into science and philosophy.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |29 pages
Introduction
part |73 pages
Logical Foundations
chapter |38 pages
Wittgenstein's Theory of Meaning
chapter |35 pages
Logic and Mathematics
part |67 pages
Theory of Scientific Method
part |53 pages
The Elimination of Metaphysics and The Positivistic Theory of Knowledge
chapter |25 pages
Elimination of Metaphysics
chapter |8 pages
Linguistic Solipsism
chapter |18 pages
The Positivistic Theory of Knowledge
part |62 pages
Radical Physicalism
chapter |19 pages
Logical Syntax of Languages
chapter |19 pages
The Physical Language
chapter |8 pages
Critique of Physicalism
part |19 pages
Conclusion