ABSTRACT
Introduction The relationship that developed between Britain and the US in the twentieth century, however remarkable and ‘special’ at times, was not automatic, instinctive, or steady; it was often dominated by serious economic and political disputes.1 In the inter-war period, the rejection of the League of Nations by the US Senate; Britain’s repudiation of its war debts; the strong areas of isolationism in America and the highly critical appraisal of Britain’s imperial role in the world – all of these factors combined to encourage censorious attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic that constantly resurfaced during the war years. Although Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt became closely associated in their struggle against the Axis, and a high degree of collaboration developed between their countries, especially on the military level, the alliance was strained by bitter differences and tensions over colonialism, trade, the post-war development of civil aviation, nuclear energy, and even issues of military strategy central to the conduct of the war itself.2 After the end of the war, relations between the British government and the Truman administration became close, though never warm. Britain needed American economic assistance to maintain bases overseas and implement domestic social reform, as well as American military power to fill the vacuum in Europe and the Middle East created by her declining strength.3 Otherwise, there would be scope for Soviet expansion. Although the US was initially reluctant to support Britain’s ‘imperial influence’, growing fear of the Soviet Union made Britain seem an essential ally and overcame misgivings about supporting colonialism. By 1946, according to Terry Anderson, a ‘new Anglo-American partnership’ had emerged, in which Britain willingly assumed the role of a ‘junior partner’.4 Despite their shared views with regard to the Soviet Union and the strategy of containment, there were still many seriously disputed questions between the two powers, such as US loans to Britain,5 the nuclear controversies,6 and a range of economic issues.7 Similarly, in the Middle East, Anglo-American interests and priorities almost coincided, but there were also rivalries and disagreements over a number of issues, such as the British economic hegemony in the region, the forces of radical Arab nationalism, and even defence: the British were anxious to
uphold their predominant influence in the region by gaining US assistance, but the Americans were concerned not to spread US responsibilities too broadly. Their attention was focused on Europe and the Far East, which they saw as the most likely arenas for an East-West confrontation. In the event of war, the Middle East would come under British responsibility; the US could make no commitment of forces for the area. However, American officials recognised the need to co-ordinate their policy with Britain, which had long been the most influential Western power in the Middle East, in order to stabilise the region and maintain the balance of power.8 The most thorny and controversial issue that plagued the Atlantic relationship in the Middle East after 1945 was Palestine. Britain sought to establish a federated, unitary state in Palestine as the best way of preserving her long-term interests in the region. The US, in contrast, for a variety of moral, political, and strategic reasons, endorsed large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine and supported the creation of a Jewish state. The ensuing Anglo-American conflict over Palestine was only overcome once the Jewish state had become a reality in 1948/9. Driven by the common desire to win Arab support in the Cold War and check Soviet penetration in the Middle East, cooperation between London and Washington in their policies vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict improved much thereafter. Still, their joint major peace initiative of 1955/6, codenamed ‘Project Alpha’, came to nothing. While this failure could be attributed to a large extent to the local complexities of the Palestine issue, it was also the result of ongoing policy differences between Britain as a European colonial power and the US as the Western superpower. This chapter analyses the scope of Anglo-American cooperation and confrontation over the Palestine question between 1945 and 1956. It first examines the evolution of the British position on Palestine between 1914 and 1947/8. It then focuses on the debate within the Truman administration on the key US priorities with regard to Palestine in the immediate post-war period, before discussing the major aspects of the Anglo-American dispute between 1945 and 1948. The chapter will finally look at Anglo-American relations and the Arab-Israeli conflict in the early 1950s, assessing both the growing commonalities between London and Washington and the limits of joint action.
