ABSTRACT
This chapter examines arguments for incompatibilism. It begins with a simple version of an argument for the incompatibilist position and proceeds to arguments for the view that are more complex. The chapter examines the major lines of response to incompatibilist arguments and assesses what one should conclude after considering the metaphysical issues pertinent to free will. Compatibilism based on challenge to transfer faces the difficulty that leading arguments for incompatibilism are put in terms of differing vocabulary, use different modal operators, and rely on different, although similar, inference rules. A challenge to one or another of the various transfer of power principles is vulnerable to defeat by an argument for incompatibilism reliant either upon a different transfer principle or upon no transfer principle at all. The chapter treats the various proposed incompatibilist lines of reasoning as distinct arguments, all of which, of course, have the same goal: to establish the truth of incompatibilism.
