ABSTRACT
The prospects for a comprehensive and complex US-Soviet arms control agreement, building on the foundations laid by SALT I and SALT II, are increasingly slim. Political paralysis in the negotiations is being outpaced by the dynamics of the weapons revolution. The Soviet Union has made arms control a hostage to the attainment of a truly major geopolitical objective: the severance of the US-European security connection. Since the mid-1950s, acquisition by the Soviets of a respectable nuclear capability meant that a first strike—inherently messy and unpredictable in its consequences—was not an attractive option for either side. A bolt out of the blue could create initial disbelief among the US decisionmakers that they would be unable to make a prompt response. Accordingly, with the stalemate in arms control, the enhanced capacity of strategic offense must be offset—and it is likely to be offset by greater reliance on the part of both sides on defensive strategic systems.
