AVELLANEDA

Although the preparation of Avellaneda's armada was already under way in Lisbon in June Ij9j,1 it was probably not decided to send him in pursuit of Drake until definite advice of the latter's objectives was received from the Canaries early in November.2

The decision had been taken by 3/I 3 November, the date of Avellaneda's instructions (document 38), which show the value of Spain's intelligence system. Her naval organization was less impressive. A vellaneda did not leave Lisbon with his eight galleons and thirteen armed merchantmen until 2 3 December Is 9 s /2 January Is 96,3 by which time the English government had learned his intentions and had perhaps sent pinnaces to warn Drake. 4 These never reached the English fleet, and Baskerville, when he took command at Porta Belo, had no precise news of A vellaneda. He did gather from the Spaniards, however, that an armada was daily expected.s To reorganize and hold the fleet together in that situation was no easy task, particularly for a soldier among sailors, and it speaks well for Baskerville's ability that he managed it. The eighteen ships that left Porta Belo on 8/18 February sailed with their artillery at the ready6 and were capable of battle. What remains astonishing, whatever one's view of the 1 Holliday to Burghley, 3 June 1595 (B.M., Cotton MSS, Titus, B. VIII, ff. 176-7);