ABSTRACT
On the first two points, we can be content with brief notations. Beliefs can be more or less sensitive to the influence of experience: if I believe that an event will occur and it does not, the belief will easily be abandoned. If I believe that social equality is bound to increase, I may not let myself be discouraged by proofs to the contrary. Beliefs are thus unequally sensitive to experience according to their contents, the nature and precision of the judgements which express them, and also according to the personality and the social role of the actor. Thus Milton Friedman reports that he has always been struck by the absence of dogmatism and the openmindedness of businessmen, as he has been struck, conversely, by the dogmatism of many intellectuals. It is because, he explains, the beliefs of the former lead to actions for which the sanction is immediate (preface to W.E.Simon, A Time for Truth, New York, Berkeley Books, 1979). On the other hand, it should be noted that beliefs are, according to the individual case, more or less isolated or more or less narrowly associated with other beliefs. In the two earlier examples we are dealing with singular beliefs expressing themselves with the aid of a simple proposition (‘It is necessary to vote’, ‘the poll will be closed’). But very often, singular beliefs belong to what it is convenient to call systems of belief. The ‘Catholic’ believes in a collection of normative and positive propositions. It is the same for the ‘liberal’. If I believe that it is necessary to vote for such a party, this belief is likely to be connected with other beliefs, belief in the relevance of its programme, in the efficacy of its leader, possibly belief in a Weltanschauung, even in an ideology.
