ABSTRACT
This chapter examines a case where an attempt was made to transform the reality of fishing in Iceland to bring it into accord with the virtual reality of neo-classical economics as expressed in the model of individual transferable quotas (ITQ) management. The allocation of quotas among producers creates conceptual boundaries around fishing rights, to which private property rights can then be attached, transforming them into commodities: individual transferable quotas. The axioms of productive and allocative efficiency lie at the heart of ITQ management and provide economists with a comprehensive and consistent model of what will happen and how people reacts when fishing rights are transformed into commodities. Since the introduction of ITQ management in 1984, and particularly since the 1990 legislation that made fishing rights true commodities, the Icelandic fishing industry has undergone a radical transformation. More importantly, however, the smaller operators and, it seems, the majority of Icelanders vehemently object to the new commodity identity of fishing rights.
