ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the triangular relationship between Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang and highlights China's reluctant role in the prelude to the Korean War. It describes the self-conception and historical mission of the 'New China', and examines China's entry into the international socialist society and the obligations for the PRC arising there from. The first collective decision of the Chinese leadership in response to the onset of the Korean War established the Northeast Border Defense Army (NEBDA). When the first US units crossed the 38th parallel on October 8, Mao issued the order to send Chinese troops to Korea, and NEBDA became the Chinese People Volunteers (CPV). The chapter also focuses on three crucial factors for the success of the intervention (ground forces, air power, and operative planning), trace these indicators over the decision-making process, and demonstrate that the Chinese leadership was evidently aware of a number of substantial and even prohibitive risks, which further mounted shortly before the intervention.
