ABSTRACT
In retrospect, the 1931-1932 Chinese boycott of Japanese goods seems eclipsed by the cannonade in Manchuria between Chinese and Japanese forces. Decentralized political and military power frustrated Chinese attempts to resist the much more effective military and economic imperialism of Japan both in Manchuria and in China proper. By 1931, Chinese industrialists were eager to promote industrial expansion at the expense of Japan. They were attracted by the exciting prospect of forcing the Japanese military to reassess the cost of aggression against China. The anti-Japanese boycott required the support of the large conglomeration of national and local commercial, manufacturing, and labor guilds and associations, as well as noneconomic social, educational, and political organs. Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated steadily during the month prior to the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, and the boycott centered in Shanghai was both a cause and an effect.
