ABSTRACT
One of the more pressing questions to emerge from recent political and economic developments in China is that of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ability to both adapt to and manage the expanding expectations and interests of a more empowered population while still holding on to their monopoly of political power. Economic development was generally viewed as a possible inroad by which political liberalization might occur and through which political actors might be able to press for reform. Though these expectations have largely proven to be excessive, the growth of the Chinese economy, internal migration, openness to global forces, and other similar changes have created increased sources of political instability. A number of studies have illustrated the unique modes of political contestation taking shape in China (O’Brien and Li 2006; Chen 2007; Ho 2008), while the overall occurrence of protest events is consistently high. Despite all this, the CCP maintains an impressive degree of control over more significant forms of unrest, including the rather severe ethnic conflicts in Tibet and Xinjiang as well as an abortive attempt at a “Jasmine Revolution” meant to mimic the revolutionary action that characterized the Arab Spring movements in 2011 and the even more recent protests in Hong Kong. While there are various reasons for how the CCP has successfully weathered popular protest, one of the more interesting explanations for CCP success is the rise of what has been called responsive authoritarianism. Though I will discuss the concept in depth below, responsive authoritarianism describes contexts in which authoritarian governments that limit more traditional expressions of political participation still attempt to respond to public grievances and concerns expressed in more unstructured forms, such as protests. In China, where protest both online and offline consistently occur, the state has remained able to identify and respond to specific grievances.
