ABSTRACT
It has become almost obligatory in recent decades for international conferences to begin with plenary declarations by national leaders about their country’s commitment to achieving a low-carbon economy. Despite this, progress towards largescale reductions in greenhouse gas emissions remains faltering in most countries. Some of the reasons for this relate to the inherent uncertainties of predictive environmental science, while others are indicative of technology and economic constraints (IPCC 2007; Stern 2007). The most intractable problems, however, appear to be political: most leaders are concerned about environmental change and have introduced emissions-reduction measures of some description. But they are also aware that climate-related policies which seriously disturb established economic and social practices are likely to trigger resistance from business groups, electorates, parliaments or even their own parties that may lead to irreversible damage to their party and their own political careers (Compston and Bailey 2008). Faced with this predicament, most national climate programmes have erred towards concrete short-term and aspirational long-term targets, the use of market-based measures to encourage clean technologies, and calls for more international cooperation, but the singular avoidance or dilution of measures that might lead to serious losses of political capital for the government.
