ABSTRACT
The exclusionary account seems to provide a viable alternative to the evaluative intuition of neutrality. This chapter explains an alternative normative interpretation of neutrality in terms of an exclusionary permission to disregard the value of adding lives, and argue that it is an intuitive and plausible option. It explores the justification and the limits of such permission, showing how it deals with the prospect of human extinction. Broome already hints at a particular normative reading of neutrality: Think about a couple who might have a child. Our intuition is that their having a child is neither better nor worse than their not having one. The normative interpretation of neutrality requires the notion of an exclusionary permission: a consideration that does not mandate, but permits ignoring the reasons stemming from the intrinsic goodness or badness of adding new lives within a certain level of well-being. It must provide a flexible approach to assessing population changes brought about by climate change.
