ABSTRACT
Scientific theories are thought to be concerned exclusively with the realm of fact, forgetting that they too require valuations, whilst ethical assertions are traditionally placed firmly on the subjective ‘value’ side of the great fact/value divide. If the defenders of the means-end model of scientific enquiry wish to retain their value-neutrality, it would seem as if they must abandon the most crucial aspect of scientific activity, that which consists in theorising, explaining and predicting. One possibility remains for the upholders of the means/end dichotomy: they may indicate that there are many forms of judgment, or valuation, besides the moral judgment which is the specific type they seek to expunge from objective, scientific theory. The social scientist may be freed from the distortions of a source of bias which so often goes undetected and which, by muddying the waters of social scientific debate, makes agreement upon a core of objective, theoretical knowledge difficult to achieve.
