ABSTRACT
I begin with an outline of the view that simple conditionals are assessed by conditional probability. Most of the chapter concerns proposals to extend this theory to account for complex sentences with conditional constituents. I consider first the three-valued approach due to de Finetti, according to which ‘If A, B’ has no truth value when A is false. I argue that this gives unacceptable results. I then discuss the approach that gives ‘If A, B’ an intermediate value when A is false, equal to the conditional probability of B given A, and assesses the conditional by its expected value. I argue that this also gives unacceptable results. I then defend a theory due to Richard Bradley, with an addition of my own. On this account, conditionals, assessed by conditional probability, are not propositions, but can be given truth conditions nevertheless, of a broadly Stalnakerian kind, and compounds of conditionals are unproblematic. My own contribution is to argue that although ‘If A, B’ has truth conditions when A is false, its truth value is often not merely uncertain but genuinely indeterminate; but that the probability assigned to it is still in good order.
