ABSTRACT
Behavioural economics has brought the conventional revealed-preference approach under attack by finding inconsistencies and context dependencies of the preference formation process (Conlisk 1996). From this emerges a vexing problem for normative economics: when preferences are no longer consistent, one has to consider whether a different measuring rod for individual welfare can and should be found (Sugden 2006a). While Sugden (2004) has promoted a notion of welfare based on opportunities and on a concept of an individual’s ‘responsibility’ as an autonomous agent, a different train of thought has been suggested by authors such as Kahneman et al. (1997) and Ng (2003). They propose to go back, in a Benthamite spirit, to the hedonistic foundations of utility and thus take a step ‘beyond’ the level of preference to the ‘deeper’ level of experienced utility (Kahneman) or happiness (Ng) as the actual factor motivating behaviour and the ultimate measuring rod for welfare.
