ABSTRACT
This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the concepts covered in the preceding chapters of this book. The book argues that natural rights theories have a wide array of powerful reasons to constrain intellectual property rights. It also argues that natural rights commitments contain a positive pressure that pushes back against ideational appropriation: the right to intellectual liberty. The book discusses the limits on the duty-impositions that can rightly be imposed by powers of appropriation, and focuses on the negative right of intellectual liberty. It draws attention to the issue of thingification. On the basis of the protection of human freedom, a person's most basic natural rights must include respect for their rights to inform their choices and actions by apprehending, investigating and learning about the world. Intellectual property needs to be equally sensitive to rights-based concerns arising in intellectual-expressive domains, and common-sense dictates that such concerns will be more implicated by property in intangible objects rather than tangible objects.
