Conclusion

The use of force by the United States against Iraq in 2003 has unquestionably created a crisis in the legitimacy of US global leadership. Whilst the Iraq Survey Group did find evidence that Saddam Hussein intended to pursue a WMD capability should economic sanctions have been abandoned by the international community, its final determination that there were no WMD stockpiles to be found in Iraq, or clear evidence that such weapons programmes had in fact been reconstituted prior to the war,2 gave vindication to critics of the doctrine of preemption who had argued that such a broad-based right to the use of force would be used to provide a convenient legal cover for the abuse of power. Further, the rise of a virulent insurgency in Iraq – stemming from perceptions that the US was an illegitimate occupying power, competition for political power among the Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis, and the exploitation of these animosities by al-Qaeda – put to rest any pretence that the US could promote democracy by force, in the Middle East or elsewhere, relatively cheaply given its material predominance. Whilst military and technological power resources did achieve regime change with relative ease, the creation of a liberal democratic polity in a country with little historical experience or indigenous entrenchment of such ideas and beliefs

has been impeded by perceptions that the US has had illegitimate intentions vis-à-vis Iraq – not to bring democracy and freedom, but to occupy and control. Why does this crisis in the legitimacy of US leadership matter, and to whom? The huge cost of quelling an insurgency whilst simultaneously creating liberal institutions and rebuilding essential infrastructure has taken a considerable toll on the US public’s appetites for the costs associated with taking an active role in international affairs. Whilst the temptations of isolationism have become more and more seductive, the rehabilitation of US global leadership is in the selfinterest of the US itself, but also in the interests of the broader international community, should it come in an amended form. First, from the perspective of the US, the temptations of isolationism provide an illusion of escape from problems of imperial overstretch. The threat posed by fundamentalist Islamic groups such as al-Qaeda and the risks of proliferation of WMD will not dissipate should the US retreat from international affairs. The attacks of September 11, 2001 clearly demonstrate that we do indeed live in a globalised and interconnected world, in which the problems of one region can quickly become the problems of another. From a broader perspective, whilst democracy promotion by force has been shown to be practically and normatively unwise, there is still much to be said for the post-Second World War belief of American strategists that it is in America’s interest to promote values of openness, freedom and democracy to forge a world safe for America, i.e. to make the world more like itself.3 From the perspective of the broader international community – the prospective followers – US leadership should still be needed and wanted, albeit in a restrained form harnessed also for the pursuit of the collective interest. The distaste for unilateralism in US foreign policy stemmed partially from the recognition that many of the world’s most difficult security challenges – from climate change and Kyoto, to ending impunity for gross human rights violations under the ICC, to the problem of WMD proliferation among others – are examples of truly global problems requiring international cooperation for their resolution. As the state with the greatest material capacity to take leadership over these issues and to effectively provide a greater share of the global public good of international order, US unilateralism was both disappointing but also a serious impediment to cooperation to solve these shared problems. Given the nature of these shared security problems, it is likely that the international community would be open to US interest in taking a constructive leadership role. How then can US leadership be rehabilitated? In Gow and Bellou’s terms, how can the alter’s image – the perception of US leadership among purported followers – be transformed? In the early days of the Obama Administration, this challenge is being approached through the lens of a ‘smart power’ strategy. In her confirmation hearing statement, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explained that smart power meant the use of

the full range of tools at our disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural – picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign

policy. . . . One need only look to North Korea, Iran, the Middle East and the Balkans to appreciate the absolute necessity of tough-minded, intelligent diplomacy – and the failures that result when that kind of diplomatic effort is absent. And one need only consider the assortment of problems we must tackle in 2009 – from fighting terrorism to climate change to global financial crises – to understand the importance of cooperative engagement. . . . We will lead with diplomacy because it’s the smart approach. But we also know that military force will sometimes be necessary, and we will rely on it to protect our people and our interests when and where needed, as a last resort.4