ABSTRACT

Indonesia occupies a vitally important position in respect of global maritime security. This chapter examines the entire population of maritime security cooperation agreements affecting Indonesia from 1988 to 2013. It shows the limitation of the bureaucratic politics approach in understanding Indonesia's participation and non-participation in maritime security arrangements. Both neorealism and neoliberalism explain that, when the benefits of cooperation are insignificant, the presence of hegemonic leadership can convince states to cooperate. Scholars, including Ball, Johnston, Acharya and Tan, echo the constructivist argument regarding the importance of shared identity in informing states' cooperation. For neorealists states are not only preoccupied with the total gains that they can achieve from a cooperation arrangement since they also take into account their concerns over relative gains. Bradford and Sato cited the calculation of costs and benefits as the reason underpinning Indonesia's reluctance to join the ReCAAP.