ABSTRACT
Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa have argued that Andy Clark and other defenders of extended cognition ommit what they call the coupling-constitution fallacy. The fallacy, they claim, is evident in two types of coupling arguments that they distinguish. In an article that first introduced most philosophers to the idea of extended cognition, Clark and David Chalmers make a case for Constitution on the basis of a parity argument. Perhaps the best-known parity argument concerns a duck: If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and flies like a duck, it is a duck. The role of parity in this argument is obvious: if something is equal to a duck in all relevant respects, it is a duck. The chapter examines two efforts to chip away at the alleged parity between Otto and Inga. Both efforts assume that cognition is a natural kind of some sort and so, like other kinds, has conditions for membership.
