ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses how the cooperative Rabobank adapts to external regulation that challenges parts of its cooperative structure. It also discusses New Institutional Sociology as the theoretical lens by which the struggle of the Rabobank can be better understood. Institutional isomorphism emphasizes that organizations compete not only for resources, but also for political influence and institutional legitimacy. J. DiMaggio and W. Powell distinguish three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change: coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism. The chapter draws on data obtained from interviews from internal stakeholders of the bank as well as documentation specifically designed for external stakeholders. Formally, the member banks are independent and have full decision-making autonomy, except for matters related to the supervisory role of the Dutch Central Bank, for which they have delegated responsibility to the supra-local organization, Rabobank Nederland. In the early stages of the cooperative movement, credit cooperatives based in Eindhoven and Utrecht obtained limited support from the established financial institutions, such as the Dutch Central Bank.
