ABSTRACT
This economics of science began with economic models of misconduct and then turned to economic analysis of the normal, legitimate activities of the scientist. The transition from misconduct to legitimate science was facilitated by focusing on Peirce’s contributions to the economics of science. Peirce proposed an economics of research project selection using a utility model which was later interpreted as a cost-benefit approach to research project selection. This costbenefit interpretation of Peirce was extended to the philosophy of Karl Popper as a critique of neglected economic aspects of falsification by Nicholas Rescher. However, quite independently of Rescher’s critique, a cost-benefit interpretation of Popper has been articulated by another philosopher. Philosopher Gerard Radnitzky (1987a, 1987b) has proposed a cost-benefit interpretation of Popper’s methodology which is a much broader than a critical reappraisal of fasification. Radnitzky’s cost-benefit elaboration of Popper extends beyond falsification to the selection of facts and theories in science.
