ABSTRACT
The topic of terrorism has generated an extensive library of books and articles, the amount of which has been increasing exponentially since the 9/11 attacks. A smaller fraction of these studies has been dedicated to the analysis of terrorism’s alter ego—counter-terrorism. Until the beginning of this century there were very few works that aimed to systematically address the successes and failures of counter-terrorism policies, and more generally, the ways in which terrorist campaigns end. The reasons for this imbalance in attention are manifold. First, as we have already noted in the initial chapters of this book, most literature on terrorism is sensationalist in character, the topic is flashy, and counter-terrorism successes may often seem anticlimactic. Second, data collection can prove to be similarly challenging to studies dealing with terrorism; while terrorist groups are known to be difficult to access, counter-terrorism officials can be just as secretive, if not even more so, than their adversaries, making it difficult to produce scientific studies with verifiable data and results. Third, also related to the nature of counter-terrorism, counter-terrorism officials who could have most to say about the topic tend to concentrate on the prevention of the next attack rather than reflect on the nature of their own work and the policies that they implement. Finally, because of this focus on prevention, the work on counter-terrorism policies and strategies is mostly concentrated on case studies evaluating what works and what does not work in counter-terrorism and on quantitative analyses that try to assess the effects of different measures. Holistic views of the terrorist challenge and the responses to it are less commonly found.
