ABSTRACT
In terms of their formal institutions, the post-communist countries of Central Europe are reasonably accountable. The last eighteen years has seen the introduction of an ample system of formal accountability institutions, mechanisms, and procedures including: free elections, parliaments, controlling systems, freedom of the press, a growing number of civil society organisations, and special legislative background (for example, acts on the confl ict of interests, public procurement, free access to information, the institution of ombudsman, and reporting rules).1 It has become diffi cult for offi cial authorities to openly dispute the principle of accountability. Paradoxically though, many post-communist scholars and the general public do not usually view political and public institutions in these countries as being accountable. The quality of formal institutions is usually thought to be much lower than that of similar institutions in Western European countries. The Central European post-communist countries have experienced formal Europeanisation, but their institutions have yet to achieve European operating standards. Why is this so? What is behind the formal façade of these institutions? What is the cause of the “accountability paradox” of Central Europe? The most readily accepted explanation ascribes to a widespread culture of informality, perpetuated by a complex “ecosystem” of informal networks, which can be seen as the standard-bearers of an “antiaccountability system”.
