ABSTRACT
From a historical perspective, the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in August 1963 emerges as the last peak of British influence on the direction of East-West relations. Thereafter, the ability of British governments to play a major East-West role began to decline. If a single ‘turning point’ can be identified, it was not the test ban treaty or even the Paris summit débâcle of May 1960, so often pinpointed in this context, but the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit at Camp David in September 1959. This meeting was crucial because, as argued in the last chapter, it effectively legitimized direct negotiations between the superpowers at heads of government level. In the longer term, personal contacts between Soviet and American leaders were bound to limit the ability of third parties to influence East-West relations: personal contacts of an exclusive nature were particularly ominous in this respect, as Macmillan realized (Macmillan, 1972, pp. 78-80). Paradoxically, to the extent that unremitting British pressure on Washington was responsible for the Camp David summit, the Macmillan government had been almost too successful. The more the leaders of the two superpowers got into the habit of consulting directly, the less they needed Britain’s services as an intermediary.
