ABSTRACT
The argument now to be discussed aims to show that all men must have a desire to function well, so that recognition of the fact that a certain way of life or form of behaviour is incompatible with living well must operate against it. It can consequently be argued that we really want what is in fact (functionally) the best life, though it does not follow that what is by all criteria the best life is really wanted by everyone. To begin with I shall ignore the overall picture of the universe as a quasiorganism, and concentrate on what follows about X’s desire for its own excellence or welfare from the fact that X is an organism. The point of doing this is that with this limitation it becomes clear that there is all the difference in the world between saying that every organism must aim at the preservation and continuance of its own life, and saying that it must aim at the development of certain capacities peculiar to it which are not related to its own survival or that of the species. Suppose we take wasps as a species of living thing. It certainly seems that that classification commits one to some general account of waspish life. There would obviously at the very least be complications if for any proposed description of a wasp’s form of life, it became clear that the whole tendency of the behaviour of the proposed members of the species was at all times to its destruction. This would amount to showing that no such classification was possible. It might be that one particular entity could for special reasons be considered a member of the species while for a time exhibiting not immediately successful suicidal tendencies-but it would have to be put down as a degenerate member. The norm must be for members to have a self-continuing tendency at least for a large portion of their lives. Suppose we grant this, we might provisionally describe the fact by saying that the norm must be for members of a species to aim at their own welfare. We might also allow for the sake of argument that classification as a species of living thing carries the implication of a tendency on the part of members of the species to perform acts that tend to the continuance of the species, This might be described by saying that not merely do members of a species have a tendency to pursue their own welfare, but also to be good members of the species, where merit is determined by the requirements of species survival. What follows? Not enough, as can be seen by returning to wasps. We are commonly told that wasps have an important role in the economy of nature, that of scavengers. By eating decaying vegetable and animal matter they keep down the spread of disease in plants and animals. Suppose now that the Public Health Department reaches a peak of efficiency whereby all decaying matter usually catered for by wasps is cleared away. Would the wasps worry? Not if someone took care to supply them with fresh meat and vegetables. They would indeed, by the previous argument, have to show a tendency to feed themselves and young, but that argument would yield nothing about a tendency to scavenge. That is an activity that is a useful effect of their taking steps to keep alive, but is an effect dependent on certain circumstances obtaining. In other circumstances the activities necessary for survival could occur without any such effects on the general economy. We should need further additions to the view to produce
the result that they have a tendency specifically to scavenge, such as, perhaps, reason for treating them as part of a larger quasi-organism in which that is their part. In that case one would expect some signs of frustration or ill effects if, as in the circumstances imagined above, they were deprived of the opportunity to fulfil this role.
