ABSTRACT
The diplomacy of the United States helped to block a prospective confrontation between Damascus and Jerusalem. By examining changes in military capabilities and diplomatic communications, intelligence analysts, embassy personnel, and the press made inferences regarding the intent of the principal actors and the likelihood of war in Lebanon. During the winter of 1982, diplomatic markers laid down by Israel, together with its enhanced military capabilities, suggested an increasing likelihood of war. Washington game planning and its organizational maneuvering in crisis management shared the elusive goal of effecting a synthesis of diplomatic and military tools. The administration’s position in mid-February 1982 was indicative of the failure to integrate diplomacy with force. The administration’s approach in mid-February 1982 was symptomatic of the quality of American diplomacy at that time. The unwillingness to use implied threats to exercise American leverage over Syria contrasted sharply with US readiness to exert diplomatic pressure on Israel for military restraint.
