ABSTRACT
This chapter looks at how a similar problem in the theory of action has been treated by philosophers and then critically evaluates some of the attempts that have sought to adopt similar strategies in the epistemology debate. It provides a dispositional account of the basing relation that is not threatened by the problem of causal deviance. The chapter discusses a dispositional account of propositional and doxastic justification. It shows that such a view has the resources to resolve the problem of causal deviance for the causal theory of the basing relation. According to the causal theory of the basing relation, for something to be a reason for a belief it must cause that belief. Another dispositions-oriented account of the basing relation has been recently championed by John Turri. Turri rejects the doxastic theories and claims that a purely causal account of the basing relation that can get around the problem of causal deviance is still possible.
