ABSTRACT
Since the 1950s, the broad chasm dividing the disciplines of economics and political science has narrowed substantially with the emergence and development of the subfield of economics called public choice theory. Public choice economists focus on the same subject matter as political scientists. Public choice analyses, however, differ fundamentally from the conventional analyses of political science. Public choice theorists build deductive models of politics and government based on the fundamental behavioral assumption of neoclassical economic theory, namely, that human decision makers are rational, self-interested utility maximizers. This entry concisely examines key topics of public choice, namely, the outcomes that emerge from direct democracy (e.g., referendums) and representative government under alternative voting rules (e.g., simple majority rule), the rent-seeking behavior of special-interest groups, and the behavior of government bureaus and enterprises. A brief review of the empirical evidence supporting public choice theory is presented. A final section examines some key limitations of public choice models.
