ABSTRACT
Another explanation for these mood-related differences in information processing stems from the cognitive tuning extension of the affect-as-information hypothesis (Clore et al. 1994; Ottati et al. 1997; Schwarz 1990; Sinclair and Mark 1992; Sinclair et al. 1994; Soldat and Sinclair, in press; Soldat et al. 1997). The affect-as-information hypothesis (Schwarz and Clore 1983, 1988; see also Clore et al. 1994; Schwarz 1990), proposes that people use their current mood state as a source of information about the state of their lives in general. Schwarz and Clore (1983) demonstrated that people’s moods only affected judgements of life satisfaction when people had no external attribution for their moods. When moods were attributed externally to a nonself-relevant source (e.g. a strange room), the moods were not seen as informative about an individual’s life, and there were no mood effects on life satisfaction judgements.
