ABSTRACT
It is widely believed that the species problem is one of the most important problems in biology as well as philosophy of biology. In this chapter, I argue that the species problem is not as important as is commonly thought. There are three main reasons that species theorists have cited for the importance of the species problem: concern for communication, its theoretical significance, and concern for biodiversity protection and identification. I argue that those problems could be significantly alleviated by observing how biologists deal with the concept of species without any agreed-upon definition of it. For example, regarding concern for communication, biologists have several ways to avoid communication breakdown when they face fundamental disagreement on the nature of species. In addition, the fact that the ‘general’ concept of species and its components, such as ‘good species’, play epistemological roles in biologists’ research makes the need to find a universally agreed-upon definition of species inessential. If these arguments are on the right track, we can conclude that we may have overemphasised the importance of the species problem.
