ABSTRACT
The term "evolutionary dynamics" often refers to systems that exhibit a time evolution in which the character of the dynamics may change due to internal mechanisms. Such models are, of course, interesting for studying systems in which variation and selection are important components. This chapter focuses on dynamical systems described by equations of motion that may change in time according to certain rules, which can be interpreted as mutation operations. It devotes to a discussion of a number of evolutionary models based on the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game as the interaction between individuals, see, e.g., Axelrod. The chapter illustrates the following: by varying the trickiness of the game (iterated game, mistakes, misunderstandings, choice of payoff matrix), by introducing spatial dimensions, and by modifying the strategy space and the representation of strategies. It discusses that the equations of motion for the different variables (individuals) in the models are usually coupled, which means that we have coevolutionary systems.
