ABSTRACT
The essence of attacks in a software defined network (SDN) always starts in a collusive manner and often targets OpenFlow due to fundamental issues prevailing in its architecture and due to cyber-criminal advancement. Attackers send client requests to a set of server port addresses on the host, a known weakness of OpenFlow infrastructure that is misused by exploiting an active port. In such instances, most of the conventional strategies that protect against such threats become ineffective because they function separately. There is a need for a constructive cyber security mechanism for leveraging SDN to avoid this; by using cyber deception, an attacker can be engaged strategically, and it is possible to manipulate his behaviors by establishing and improving his network view. Because game theory uses a quantitative model, the cyber decoy can be used to examine the impact that deception can have on the attacker’s beliefs. In this way, the sequence of an attack can be investigated, and how the values of the attacker evolve and impact his behavior can be determined.
