ABSTRACT
Corporation tax games were introduced by Meca and Varela-Peña (2018) as an application of linear cost games (see Meca and Sosic, 2014) to a corporate tax reduction system. The authors considered a model of cooperation in corporate tax systems with one benefactor and several beneficiaries. In this chapter, we present a new model of cooperation in corporate tax systems with several beneficiaries and multiple dual benefactors: multiple corporation tax games. Benefactors are dual in the sense they reduce the costs of both beneficiaries and other benefactors. We can say that they are benefactors and beneficiaries. They are also irreplaceable benefactors because all the members of a coalition may see their cost increase if one of them leaves the group. We prove the grand coalition is stable in the sense of the core of multiple corporation tax games. Then, we propose the Shapley value as an easily computable core-allocation that benefits all agents and, in particular, compensates the benefactors for their dual and irreplaceable role.
