ABSTRACT
What can deterrence contribute to reducing the risks of terrorism by jihadists using weapons of mass destruction (WMD)?1 In the months after 9/11, there was sharp despair that deterrence might contribute anything at all to the challenges posed by militant Islamist extremists. The National Security Strategy issued by the U.S. government in that period summarized the prevailing view as follows:
Introduction 259 Scope of Inquiry 261
Jihadist Footsoldiers 263 Terrorist Professionals 265 Leaders 265 Affiliate Groups 268 Operational Enablers 268 Moral Legitimizers 269 State Sponsors 270 Passive State Enablers 271
Assessing the Contributions of Deterrence to Risk Reduction 272 Recommendations for Enhancing Deterrence 274 Notes 277
Over the next few years, however, thinking shifted at senior levels of the Bush administration. In September 2006, the administration issued a revised version of its National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which clearly stated that deterrence is a primary objective. This theme was echoed in other guidance as well.3 If “traditional concepts” are out, what new concepts should inform counterterror planning and operations? What role might deterrence already be playing? What more can reasonably be asked of deterrence against such a diffuse and motivated enemy? How can its contributions to risk reduction be enhanced in the course of a “long war”?
