A Palestinian State: Evaluating the Risks
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A Palestinian State: Evaluating the Risks book
A Palestinian state is almost a fait accompli. The process of institution-building in the West Bank, since 1967; the crystallization of national identity during the Palestinian uprising (the Intifada, which began in 1987); and, particularly, the success of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)1 in establishing the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the cities of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, seem to indicate that a Palestinian state will soon come into being.2 As a matter of fact, the Palestinians already have a quasi-state and enjoy the trappings of statehood, such as a ﬂag, a passport, stamps, full jurisdiction over all Palestinian cities, and a large police force, which is, for all practical purposes, an army. After the January 1997 Hebron agreement, most Palestinians are not longer under Israeli occupation and the PA is largely responsible for their well-being. Indeed, much of the international community supports the establishment of a Palestinian state, as well as a growing segment of the Israeli body politic.3 Given the advanced stage of the Palestinian state-building process and the international dynamics involved, even Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, the Likud leader, echoed by his advisor, David Bar-Ilan, have expressed their willingness to consider a Palestinian state, albeit one endowed with limited sovereignty.