ABSTRACT
Contents 13.1 Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312 13.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312 13.3 Layered Security Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
13.3.1 Networking Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 13.3.1.1 Routing Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 13.3.1.2 MAC Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 13.3.1.3 Physical Layer Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
13.3.2 Security Issues in Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316 13.3.3 Security Issues in Cryptographic Protocols. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 13.3.4 Service Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
13.4 Limitations of Layered Security Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 13.4.1 Redundant Security Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318 13.4.2 Non-adaptive Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319 13.4.3 Power Inefficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
13.5 Cross-Layer Security Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 13.5.1 Existing Cross-Layer Design Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 13.5.2 New Schemes of Cross-Layer Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
13.5.2.1 Cross-Layer Design for Heterogeneous Requirements and Service Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
13.5.2.2 Cross-Layer Design for Intrusion Detection . . . . . . 322 13.5.2.3 Cross-Layer Design for Power Efficiency . . . . . . . . . 323 13.5.2.4 Cross-Layer Design for Key Management . . . . . . . . 323 13.5.2.5 Cross-Layer Design for Detecting
Selfish Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324 13.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
13.1 Abstract The wireless sensor network (WSN) is a newly emerging technology that represents a significant improvement over traditional sensors in many applications. Improved security is especially important for the success of the WSN, because the data collected is often sensitive and the network is particularly vulnerable. A number of approaches have been proposed to provide security solutions against various threats to the WSN, most of which are based on the layered design. In this chapter we point out that these layered approaches are often inadequate and inefficient in addressing the distinguishing features of the WSN, such as open access medium, dynamic network topology, and limited node resources on computation, storage, bandwidth, and power. Instead, it is advantageous to break with the conventional layering rules and design a security scheme for the WSN based on information from several protocol layers. We overview the existing schemes for the cross-layer design of WSN security and propose some new solutions. A few open problems in this area are also discussed.
