ABSTRACT
Critical rationalism is a school of thought whose major exponent is karl Popper. Joseph Agassi, Hans Albert, William W. Bartley, Ian Jarvie, Noretta koertge, Alan Musgrave, David Miller, and John Watkins are other philosophers who have contributed to it. Here I follow mainly Popper’s version of critical rationalism. In a nutshell, it can be characterized as “an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience; it is fundamentally an attitude of admitting that ‘I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth’” (Popper 1971: 225). Critical rationalism differs radically from the traditional rationalism of Plato, Descartes, and the like, in a number of ways. First, traditional rationalism puts reason above experience in knowledge acquisition. Second, it claims that reason can justify our beliefs, claims, and theories. Third, it asserts that it is possible to obtain certain, indubitable, foundational knowledge by reason. Critical rationalism rejects all of these. Neither reason nor experience has any priority in acquiring knowledge. Nor does critical rationalism try to do justice to reason and experience by taking them as equally primordial. Critical rationalism is, above all, a matter of willingness to correct one’s mistakes by appealing to both. “Reason” in this context refers not to a faculty possessed by all people but to clear, critical thinking which is essentially social and grows in interaction with others. Critical rationalism is modeled on the Socratic method of critical inquiry. The sole function of critical argumentation and experience is to check whether our beliefs, claims, or theories are true or false. If we are lucky, we can show them to be false and eliminate them. But neither reason nor experience can ever justify a belief, a claim, or a theory to be true or even probably true. Critical rationalism is thoroughly antijustificationist. In that respect, it is an extremely radical approach which diverges from the entire tradition of epistemology, whether rationalist or empiricist. Traditionally, a belief is said to be held rationally if it is justified by reason or experience. Justification appears as a necessary condition also of (propositional) knowledge. More explicitly, according to the traditional account of knowledge, a person, S, knows that p (where p is a proposition) if and only if (i) S believes that p, (ii) S has justification (evidence,
good reasons) for p, and (iii) p is true. But that account is threatened by an infinite regress. For one can always demand further justification for the evidence or the reasons one has. If one does not want to be a dogmatist or a skeptic, one must stop this regress somewhere. It is at this point that traditional epistemologists appeal to foundational beliefs which are epistemologically basic. Whereas rationalists such as Descartes resort to clear and distinct ideas or intuitions, empiricists like Locke turn to sense experience or observation. Both camps take refuge in some form of foundationalism. Critical rationalism denies that there can ever be justification (experiential or otherwise) for our beliefs. It gives an account of “knowledge” that is antithetical to the one widely accepted by rationalists and empiricists alike. Moreover, for the critical rationalist there are no truths about the world that can be known beyond any doubt, either through reason or experience. Certainty is unattainable, and the search for it is futile. Even the simplest empirical claim might be wrong, no matter how strongly it is believed. Critical rationalism is fallibilist as well as being anti-justificationist and antifoundationalist. Nevertheless, rationality and objectivity are possible. Rationality has nothing to do with justification, but has everything to do with openness to criticism. Similarly, objectivity is a matter not just of impartiality or open-mindedness of the believer, but of collaborative efforts of relentless criticism of our views that are intersubjectively criticizable.
