ABSTRACT
The context of the reference to R. Eliezer b. Jacob’s rule in the scholium may be instructive. The rule is quoted to legitimize, or provide support for, a statement in Megilat Taanit that on the 22nd day of Elul courts regained the authority to execute apostates. Gedaliah Alon argues that the rule was invoked to close the gap by suggesting that the old precedents were extra-legal, but imposed on the authority of R. Eliezer b. Jacob’s rule. Legal certainty requires adherence to existing rules, even if this generates unjust or ineffective judgments in particular instances. In western law, the sole situation in which a court is authorized to deviate from the law is when a state of emergency has been declared and emergency regulations are in force. The widespread acceptance of R. Eliezer b. Jacob’s rule, and its central role in defining the court’s power and authority, it was qualified in various ways, with a view to restricting its scope.
