ABSTRACT
The introduction of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in Chinese agriculture in the early 1980s re-established the household farm as the basic unit of production. Farm management decisions were largely devolved to the household level and households were entitled to residual income after their meeting of certain quota and tax obligations. The rapid growth of agricultural output and income in the immediate reform period has been widely attributed to improved production incentives under the HRS versus the commune system that it replaced (see e.g. Lin et al. 1996; Putterman 1993). Cropland tenure arrangements under the HRS have been characterized by the assignment of land use rights to individual households, but the ongoing collective ownership of land (with associated restrictions on transferability and alienability), and the periodic reallocation of land use rights in response to demographic changes and in accordance with the equal entitlement rule. The practice of periodic reallocations has continued despite it being incongruous with national policy (see the Introduction to this book).
