ABSTRACT
The properties and outcomes of interfirm networks in terms of effectiveness and efficiency have been fairly well analysed. Alliances among different firms have been shown to be superior to both an integrated firm and market contracting when there are contrasting production and transaction cost functions for all the parties involved, such as high coordination costs deriving from asset specificities and uncertainty favouring integration, and economies of specialization and scale favouring deverticalization (Eccles 1981; Mariotti and Cainarca 1986). Other studies have shed light on the advantages of alliances for pooling complementary and co-specialized resources and for generating successful innovations (Richardson 1971; Teece 1986; Ouchi and Bolton 1988). The dynamic efficiency properties of interfirm networking in terms of increasing the learning capacities of economic systems, lowering the costs of adaptation to market demands and decreasing the difficulties of organizational change, have also been analyzed (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Colombo, forthcoming; Cantwell, forthcoming).
