ABSTRACT
The tangled webs of deception in war and statecraft can be traced back into ancient history, mythology and scripture – from when a Greek warrior posed as a deserter to lead the Wooden Horse into the city of Troy1 to when Gideon, sometime leader of the Tribe of Israel, used deception to defeat the Midianites. 2 Modern warfare and the establishment of permanent intelligence organisations proffered new challenges and opportunities for the conduct of what became known as strategic deception. Sir Michael Howard describes this as ‘the deception of the enemy High Command as distinct from his forces in the field’ 3 Such terminology underlines the distinctive military aspect to the subject, though deception in peacetime is an often integral part of intelligence operations. Among the best examples of strategic deception are those wartime operations where historians have gained access to relevant records (and in some cases to archives of the various belligerents involved).
