ABSTRACT
The issue of defining and measuring individual freedom of choice has received considerable attention recently (see, inter alia, Arrow (1995), Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (1994), Gravel (1994; 1996), Jones and Sugden (1982), Klemisch-Ahlert (1993), Pattanaik and Xu (1990; 1995), Puppe (1995; 1996a; b), Puppe and Xu (1995), Sen (1988; 1990; 1991; 1993a), Sugden (1985) and Suppes (1987)). Typically, this question is handled by studying the consequences of imposing ‘plausible’ properties, or axioms, on the binary relation induced by the statement ‘offers at least as much freedom as’ applied
to alternative individual opportunity sets. In this approach, an opportunity set is interpreted as the set of all options (commodity bundles, political candidates, lawful activities, etc.) to which an individual has access and from which she will, in some latter stage, make a choice.
