ABSTRACT
This paper consists of an attempt to use the axiomatic approach in investigating rights by means of game forms (for a recent paper which explores the relationship between rights and game forms see Hammond (1994)). The assignment of rights to the members of a society is, usually, part of the constitution of the society. Therefore, in order to investigate it we need a definition of constitution. Such a definition is given in Arrow (1967). However, if we adopt Arrow’s definition of constitution (i.e., that a constitution is a ‘well-behaved’ social welfare function-see Arrow (1967)), then we have to accept the conclusion of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem that there is no satisfactory constitution. We quote from (Arrow, (1967, p. 228)):
This conclusion is quite embarrassing, and it forces us to examine the conditions which have been stated as reasonable. It’s hard to imagine anyone quarreling either with the Pareto Principle or the condition of Non-Dictatorship. The principle of Collective Rationality may indeed be questioned. One might be prepared to allow that the choice from a given environment be dependent on the history of previous choices made in earlier environments, but I think many would find that situation
unsatisfactory. There remains, therefore, only the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, which will be examined in greater detail in Section IV below.
