ABSTRACT
Sir Pierson Dixon, leader at official level of the British delegation to the Brussels negotiations, once claimed that at the time of de Gaulle's veto all that separated Britain and the Six were a handful of points about 'bacon and eggs'. 2 Countless hours of detailed and technical discussions at ministerial, deputy and expert level focused on agricultural policy, often centred on the most arcane of matters, such as the best form of subsidy to be paid to British pig farmers or the speed at which the preference enjoyed by Australian cereals should be withdrawn. A complete survey of that portion of the Brussels negotiations devoted to agriculture is far beyond the scope of this chapter, which focuses instead on three tasks. First, it traces the evolution of the agricultural discussions from early 1961, when the British decided that the fate of their farmers need not constitute an insuperable barrier to EEC membership, until the deadlock of October-December 1962. Secondly, it examines some factors which help to explain the difficulties encountered in the discussions of British agriculture; and thirdly, it attempts to assess the wider importance of these talks in the context of the first British application. It is largely based upon newly released documents from the United Kingdom (UK) and from the European Community (EC) institutions.
