ABSTRACT
The initial Cold War planning assumption adopted by the post-1945 Attlee government was that hot war was unlikely before 1957.1 In the meantime the emphasis would be on air and sea forces sufficient to act as a deterrent to hot war and as a foundation for fighting the Cold War at a political level. The top defence priority was the creation of a nuclear bomber force for strategic offence to deter in peace and defend in wartime. Carrier-based nuclear bombers were considered, only to be dismissed on grounds of both practicability and cost. This also had the beneficial side effect of preventing the kinds of inter-service battles that dominated the post-war American scene. Indeed, next in line in defence priorities was a fleet based on carrier and anti-submarine forces to maintain sea communications in war and exert both presence and more limited military and constabulary force in peace. After much controversy a well-named ‘Revised Restricted Fleet’ plan was adopted in 1949. This envisaged a peacetime active fleet of two fleet carriers, three light fleet carriers (with a Naval Aviation strength of 250 aircraft), 13 cruisers, 60 destroyers and frigates, 20 submarines and 36 mine-countermeasures vessels. Even when the international situation deteriorated seriously in 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War and the Attlee government began to re-arm beyond its means, the active fleet corresponded to this plan. At its peak in 1952-53 the active fleet’s 123 major combat units comprised five carriers, 12 cruisers, 67 destroyers and frigates and 39 submarines (the maintenance of twice the number of submarines in active service is noteworthy).
