ABSTRACT

DURING THE FIRST TWO YEARS of the Occupation of Japan, American officials pushed successive Japanese governments to effect liberal reforms in a wide variety of fields. But by the fall of 1947 American policy shifted in the direction of economic reconstruction and open support of the more conservative elements in Japan. Predictably scholars differ on the primary impetus behind the shift and its significance for the “democratization” of post-war Japan. Orthodox Western accounts of the Occupation, most notably Edwin O. Reischauer's The United States and Japan, treat the shift largely in terms of American responsiveness to Cold War concerns over the “loss” of China, strategic fear of the Soviet Union, and the perceived growth of communism in Japan. In addition it is argued that the poor performance of the Japanese economy required recovery measures if the early reforms, especially the political ones, were to be preserved. Slight modification and “some curtailment” of the reform program was necessary to make Japan an economically viable democratic showcase in the Cold War struggle against world communism. 1