ABSTRACT
Any analysis of the rise and fall of the British empire in tropical Africa leads us into a central paradox. It was acquired at the end of the last century to exclude foreign powers from these territories, but without positive intentions of developing them economically as imperial estates. For the next half century, as a result, the English pro-consuls could do comparatively little to develop their colonies. During the interwar years of ‘Indirect rule’ 2 they made a virtue of preserving indigenous institutions for which they had brought no substitute, and so looked not unlike curators watching over an ethnological museum. Not until after 1945 when the economic recovery of the United Kingdom from war required it, did the empire begin to invest large capitals in the mise en valeur of its African colonies. Yet, at precisely that moment the strategists of Whitehall planned to dismantle their colonial system on the assumption that independence was inevitable within the next two decades. Paradoxically an empire acquired when it was not wanted was to be given up when needed most. Had British planners decided that nationalism was the continuation of imperialism by other and more efficient means ? Perhaps. Had African nationalists grown strong enough to send their district commissioners packing? Probably not. Or had anti-imperial sentiment in Britain and the United States cracked the will to empire at last? May be.
