Operation Starkey 1943

After the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, it became clear that the only major Allied cross-Channel operation likely to be feasible that year was an uncontested landing in the event of a total German collapse. On 4 March 1943, the British Joint Planners decided that a landing force of 12 brigade groups with tactically loaded back-up would be required in face of any organized resistance. A force of that size was so far out of reach, however, that there was no point in attempting to remedy the situation even by curtailing plans for operations in the Mediterranean. ¹ Nevertheless, at the insistence of the Prime Minister on 10 April, every effort was to be made to conceal the actual state of Allied weakness in England. One way to do so was by deception. The London Controlling Section (LCS) had already drawn up broad strategic plans based on decisions made at Casablanca. These plans called for steps to encourage German overestimation of Allied strength and capacity to undertake major operations on all fronts where such threats could plausibly be maintained. An appropriate disposition of forces and intensive invasion training in the UK, coupled with the exaggeration of the rate of American build-up (Bolero), were calculated to pin down German forces in the West. ² With the appointment of Lieutenant-General F.E. Morgan as Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate) or COSSAC, all cross-Channel operations, except for minor raids, became the responsibility of his combined staff at Norfolk House in London. Morgan’s directive on 26 April charged him with the simultaneous planning of three operations: the actual invasion in 1944 (Overlord); the uncontested return to the Continent (Rankin); and thirdly, ‘an elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the whole summer with a view to pinning the enemy in the West and keeping alive the expectation of large-scale cross-Channel operations in 1943’. There was also some expectation of a bonus in the shape of an air battle over the Channel on advantageous terms for the Metropolitan RAF and Eighth USAAF. ³